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The practical turn: towards a pragmatist philosophy of history.   






As announced in the abstract, this paper seeks to overcome the current fragmentation in the 
philosophy of history by establishing a relationship between historical experience, historical 
writing, and action. In this context, this paper looks both back and forward. Looking back, it 
connects to a long tradition in the philosophy of history, which saw history as thought and 
action.
1
 Looking forward, this paper reinterprets this tradition from a pragmatist point of view, 
that is, it tries to do justice to historical practice. Recognizing that time is short today, I will frame 
my paper in 4 theses which I will briefly flesh out.  
 
Before I start, however, I want to make clear that by choosing the label pragmatism for my 
position, I do not subscribe to any particular philosophical movement. Though some pragmatist 
ideas have been helpful, I have developed the main argument in practice. First, as a consultant in 
many profit and non profit organizations, and next, as a lecturer in the course ´learning histories 
and organizations´ at the University of Groningen. In this course, Frank Ankersmit, Jaap den 
Hollander and myself have trained students of history to apply their knowledge and skills to help 
organizations to learn from the past. So far we have applied this method in more than 70 
organizations, varying from very small ones to very big ones, like Philips and the Dutch Tax 
Administration.
2
 In the course we have used many historical theories, varying from hermeneutics 
and narrativism to systems theory. By testing these theories in practice, we have gradually 
developed a workable synthesis which we offer to the students. I will now give you a short 
summary in 4 theses and show what they mean in the context of learning histories.  
 
1.  In order to understand the relationship between historical experience and action, 
historical practice should be studied from the inside. On this point, I explicitly connect to 
classic philosophers of history like Droysen, Dilthey, Croce, Gentile, Collingwood and 
Oakeshott, and Ortega y Gasset. In contrast to most contemporary philosophers of history, many 
of these philosophers were not only active as historians, but also politicians and as political 
thinkers.  With regard to applying history thought to action, therefore, they were not outsiders, 
but insiders. Accordingly, their philosophies of history were not refined contemplations of 
finished products, varying from monuments to narratives, but reflections on the function of 
history for life, as they called it, or on historical practice, as I will call it.  
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Now, the most important thing to be learned from the insider’s point of view, is that there is no 
clear separation between historical experience, historical method, and historical writing. From the 
insider’s perspective all these are aspects of a single practice which comprises all. Most 
importantly, there is no breach between historical practice and action.  Historical experience and 
historical writing are part and parcel of action; we study the past in function of the present. In 
terms of the classic philosophers of history, historical research and writing is ´atto in atto´, ´act in 
action´, or ´enactment´.  For learning historians, this theory is a fact of life; every singly moment 
they experience that there is no clear dividing line between themselves and the organizations they 
study; indeed, the very fact that they study the past of organizations, is already an intervention in 
the organization. Or to say it in solemn philosophical words: in learning histories subject and 
object are one.  
 
2.  The notion of  historical experience should be broadened 
When we agree with the classical philosophers that history is an integral part of life, we must also 
acknowledge that there are many ways to ‘relate to the past’. 3 From this point of view, sublime 
historical experiences, like trauma or nostalgia, are only extreme cases of relating to the past. In 
daily life, and that is what counts  for a pragmatist, there are many other ways of ‘relating to the 
past’ such as memory, surprise, and most importantly, action itself: in action we relate past and  
present with a view on the and future. Moreover, experience should not be limited to the non-
linguistic realm; if an old paining by Guardi, or Rococo ornaments can ‘move’ us to having an 
historical experience
4, why can’t a video, speech, or indeed, a historical narrative? Moreover, if 
we listen to a song, we do not only experience the music, but the music in relation to the text 
which clearly shows that the distinction between the non-linguistic and the linguistic is not 
helpful for understanding experience as a whole. On this basis, we teach our learning historians 
that in the daily life organizations for example, people not only cherish old furniture, paintings, 
flags, but also experience the past in speeches, and videos. For learning historians it is silly to 
leave linguistic expressions of the experiences of the past aside; it would limit the range of their 
sources too much, and thus considerably decrease the learning outcome of their histories.   
 
 
3.  Historical representations can be seen as expressions of historical experience. 
How can we connect experience to narrative? This is an important question, because, in the 
theory of history, historical experience and narrative have so far been studied separately. Even 
Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit, who have greatly contributed to both fields, have not yet 
elaborated a synthesis between them.  Moreover, focusing on the sublime, these two thinkers 
have stressed the passive side of historical experience at the cost of its active side. In this context,  
pragmatic aesthetical theory, which formed the starting point of Ankersmit’s theory, can be 
helpful on two points. First, because it recognizes quite ordinary experiences like hearing a bird’s 
song, or enjoying a meal with friends. Second, it is helpful because it shows us how the bird’s 
song may be developed into an entire symphony or and the experience of the meal with friends 
into a novel.
5
 Pragmatic aesthetics thus shows us how artists not only passively undergo 
experiences, but also how they actively elaborate these experiences.  
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Along these lines, the theory of history can be expanded, be showing how historical experience is 
elaborated into narrative. In his last book, Ankersmit makes a first step in that direction when he 
discusses ‘The Waning of the Middle Ages’ as an ‘expression’ of Huizinga’s historical 
experience.
6
 The classical philosophers of history, would have welcomed this view of the 
narrative as ‘an expression’ of historical experience, in fact, it lay at the basis of their own 
expressivist aesthetics. But for the pragmatist narrative as expression is not good enough. He 
would stress that art, or in this case historical narrative, must always be understood in the context 
of the historian’s interaction with his environment. From a pragmatist point of view, historical 
narratives are instruments for action.  
 
 
4. Historical narratives are instruments for action. 
 
For most historians, this is a most provocative thesis; indeed, most of them simply reject it. In 
their view, historical narrative degraded to an ‘instrument for action’ can no longer be factual let 
alone be objective. Learning historians, however, explicitly declare that their narratives are 
instruments for action. Narratives which fail to provide ‘actionable knowledge’ are simply 
useless. The thesis that historical narratives are instruments for action therefore needs a strong 
theoretical basis. The starting point here is the pragmatist theory that a judgment is true when it 
is effective. From this it follows that verification of a judgment lies not in correspondence, 
nor in coherence, but in future consequences. For example, the judgment 'Sugar is sweet' 
means that when the sugar is subjected to specific tests, for example, tasting it, certain 
consequences will follow. Likewise, the judgment 'Water is H2O' is 'primarily a statement of 
the conditions under which water comes into existence' and it is 'also a direction for 
producing pure water and for testing anything that is likely to be taken for water'. 7 
 
This theory has net severe opposition, on the ground that verification in the future, or 
reference to the future makes judgements about the past impossible. Not surprisingly, among 
the most outspoken critics were some renowned historians like Arthur Lovejoy.  Their most 
cogent criticism that a historical judgment, such as 'Jonathan Swift married Stella', does not 
have any practical consequences. Obviously, this criticism pierces the heart of the pragmatist 
theory of truth, because if a historical judgement has no practical consequences, it cannot be 
true in the pragmatist sense.  
In order to save the pragmatist theory of truth for history, one could argue that f.e. Fritz 
Fisher's judgement that Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and his cabinet planned an large scale 
attack on Europe in 1913, had enormous practical consequences; it actually deconstructed the 
myth Germans had believed for more than four decades. But this argument does not away 
that ‘Jonathan Swift did indeed marry Stella is in fact true, even if it has no practical 
consequences. In short, it is very difficult to apply the pragmatist theory of future reference to 
descriptive sentences of the past.  
A more fruitful defense focuses on historical representations.  As Donald Schön argued, the 
metaphorical representation of a bad quarter in the city as ‘a disease’ clearly has far-reaching 
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practical consequences; the metaphor disease frames the problem and therefore also the 
solution.8  Likewise, the representation of  a certain period in history as the 'Cold War'  has 
had far- reaching practical consequences; not only did we represent a part of the past with this 
metaphor, but we literally lived in it. And now that the Cold War has ended, we live as if it 
belongs to the past. In short, the representation ‘Cold War’ had serves both as a 
representation of the past and as a plan for action; it enable people to understand the past in 
function of the present. Thus, the historical judgement that ‘The period from1949-89 is the 
Cold War’ has been verified on a daily basis. Just like the concept H2O enables a scientist to 
test whether a liquid is water, a historical representation ‘The End of  Cold War’ legitimizes 
our politicians to buy very expansive Joint Strike Fighters, or to build ‘Fort Europe’ as the 
EU is currently called. And like H2O means ‘being liquid’, ‘boils at 100 degrees’, ‘The End 
of the Cold War’ simply means buying Joint Strike Fighters, or building Fort Europe. 
Now people will probably retort that this is an example from recent history. But the theory 
also applies to earlier periods. Take for example, the Italians. They live in the belief that 
Renaissance took place in their national history. And indeed, the representation ‘Renaissance’ 
still has practical consequences. Not only in the sense that you can find Renaissance art in 
Italian cities, but also in the deeper sense that the Renaissance forms part of the beliefs upon 
which Italians act on a daily basis.  Likewise, a representations like ‘Pericles Athens’ still 
dominate our conceptions of democracy, just as our representation of prehistoric times 
conditions our view of mankind.  In short, historical representations have a strong practical 
value.  This becomes very clear in learning histories. When CEO of the the biggest Dutch 
Bank framed the situation in 2002 as ‘the endgame’, he and his managers began to buy many 
other banks in order to survive the end of times. By now, we all know the consequences…..9 
 To sum up: in this paper I have shown that a pragmatist philosophy of history enables us 
synthesize the separated fields in the discipline into a workable theory of learning histories. 
In particular, it enables us to relate historical experience to the narrative, and the narrative to 
action.  The connection between historical experience and narrative can be made by taking 
the narrative substance, or representation as an expression of an historical experience. The 
connection between the narrative and action can be established by taking the representation 
as a plan for action. Along these lines, and with the help of the classic philosophers of 
history, we envisage a new future for the philosophy of history.  
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